Abstract: This article analyses management of hydropower dams within monopolistic and oligopolistic competition and when hydroelectricity producers are risk averse and face demand uncertainty. In each type of market structure we analytically determine the water release path in closed-loop equilibrium. We show how a monopoly can manage its hydropower dams by additional pumping or storage depending on the relative abundance of water between different regions to smooth the effect of uncertainty on electricity prices. In the oligopolistic case with symmetric risk aversion coefficient, we determine the conditions under which the relative scarcity (abundance) of water in the dam of a hydroelectric operator can favor additional strategic pumping (storage) in its competitor's dams. When there is asymmetry of the risk aversion coefficient, the firm's hydroelectricity production increases as its competitor's risk aversion increases, if and only if the average recharge speed of the competitor's dam exceeds a certain threshold, which is an increasing function of its average water inflows.
Introduction
In 2012, hydroelectricity supplied 16.3% of world electricity; growth has occurred almost all over the world (IPCC 2014) .
1 Countries where hydroelectricity is the main source of electricity are Norway, at 98%, Brazil, at 97%, the Province of Quebec, Canada, at 90%, and New Zealand, at 80% (Cramps and Moreaux, 2001 ). Because of climate change, the contribution of hydroelectricity to world electricity is expected to grow. Indeed, decarbonizing (i.e. reducing the carbon intensity) electricity generation is a key component of cost-effective mitigation strategies intended to stabilize temperatures. In most integrated modelling scenarios, decarbonizing happens more rapidly in electricity generation than in the industrial, buildings, and transport sectors (IPCC, 2014) . This will lead to the growth of renewable energy including hydropower.
2 Nonetheless, the economic literature has mainly analyzed the strategic behavior of electricity operators on the wholesale electricity market in purely thermal systems or mixed hydrothermal systems. 3 Purely hydroelectric industries with large water storage capacities have attracted little attention.
Ambec and Doucet (2002) examined the problem of managing run of river hydropower dams under a monopolistic and oligopolistic structure when water inflows are deterministic. They used a two-period model to show that the absence of a water market during hydroelectric production can engender two sources of loss of social welfare: suboptimal management of water resources and the exercise of market power. Van Ackere and Ochoa (2010) used a stylized deterministic simulation model to evaluate the impact of the liberalization of the hydroelectric industry on the 1 The share of renewables in global electricity generation approached 21% in 2012 (Enerdata, 2013) , making renewables the third largest contributor to global electricity production, just behind coal and gas. IPCC (2014) expects that renewable energy will become the second-largest contributor before 2020. Renewable energy includes bioenergy, direct solar energy, geothermal energy, hydropower, ocean energy, and wind energy (IPCC, 2014) .
2 Nonetheless, as Fischedick et al. (2011) contends, the long-term percentage contribution of some individual renewable energy sources (e.g., hydropower, bioenergy, and ocean energy) to climate change mitigation may be limited by the available technical potential in countries where deep reductions in GHG emissions are sought.
3 quantity and price of electricity produced. They show that total electricity production is clearly lower in a non-liberalized market. Haddad (2011) developed a two-period model that characterizes the effects of deterministic seasonal water inflows on storage capacity optimal water management.
Nonetheless, the works above have not integrated the risk dimension, which is quite salient for suppliers of electricity from hydraulic structures. Water reserves are renewed randomly by precipitation. Thus, in the extreme case that precipitation is zero. The water stock is a temporarily finite resource because using a unit of water stored in the dam would constitute one unit less for the following period. Given the climate change phenomenon and the associated series of extreme events (IPCC, 2014) , the challenge of optimal management of this resource over several periods of time has become more pressing.
On the demand side, operators of hydroelectric plants are also facing several sources of uncertainty closely linked to different categories of electricity consumers. Residential demand strongly depends on climate conditions, which determine the intensity of use of home appliances, along with electricity prices (Reiss and White, 2005; Dergiades and Tsoulfidis, 2008) . In contrast, commercial and industrial demand is strongly associated with economic conditions, and some macroeconomic policy changes (Dilaver and Hunt, 2011) . Electricity demand (residential, industrial and commercial) therefore fluctuates over the short term, and operators may find it difficult to smooth prices (Genc and Thille, 2012) . Climate change may also exacerbate water and energy tensions across sectors and regions, potentially impacting hydropower (either positively or negatively, depending on whether the potential climate-adaptation benefits of hydropower facilities are realized) and on other technologies that require water (Arent et al., 2011; Cisneros and Oki, 2014 In this paper, we analyze the behavior of hydropower producers that are risk averse and face electricity demand uncertainty. To do so, we develop a dynamic model in which the hydroelectric park comprise multiple mountain reservoir-type dams, and posit two different industrial structures: monopolistic and oligopolistic. 5 We analytically determine the water release path at closed-loop equilibrium. We show how a monopoly manages hydropower reservoirs by additional pumping or storing depending on the relative abundance of water between different regions to smooth the effect of demand uncertainty. In addition, risk aversion reduces variance of water pumping when the net flow of precipitation is either positive or negative. In the duopolistic case with symmetric risk aversion, we determine the conditions under which the relative scarcity (abundance) of water in an operator's dam can favor strategic additional pumping (storage) at the competitor's dams. In the case of a duopoly with asymmetric aversion rates, we show that a firm's hydroelectric production increases in parallel with its competitor's risk aversion, if and only if the average recharge speed of the competitor's dam exceeds a certain threshold that increasingly depends on the average water inflows.
4 Philpott and Guan (2013) empirically analyze social welfare following the opening of a wholesale electricity market in New Zealand when the social planner is risk averse about uncertainty of water inflows. Aslo see Genc and Sen (2008) for an empirical analysis.
5 Deregulation processes have engendered several market structures. The industry is ranked according to four models based on the degree of competition: vertically integrated monopoly, single buyer, competition on the wholesale electricity market and competition on the retail market (Hunt, 2002) .
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the dynamic and stochastic model of management of hydroelectric park with multiple dams. Section 3 analyzes the situation of a monopoly. Section 4 covers the case where dams are managed by oligopolies with asymmetric attitude toward risk, whereas Section 5 examines the case of risk asymmetry. The last section concludes the paper.
Model

Electricity demand
Demand in period t is represented by an inverse demand function of linear form (Genc and Thille, 2012):
where t p represents the price of electricity, t Q the quantity demanded, b is a positive constant and the parameter t a is normally distributed with an expectation of a and a variance of 2  .
Electricity production
Let us define by it q the electricity production of dam i   
where
is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion.
Dam management under a monopolistic structure
We assume an electricity industry with a monopolistic structure. Using the demand function defined by (1) and the profit function given by (3), the operator's objective function defined by (4) is:
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By assuming that the precipitation inflows to the different hydropower dams are independent, we can therefore write equation (5) as:
The monopoly chooses the electricity production path
by n hydropower dams as a solution to the dynamic and stochastic optimization problem with an infinite horizon. The solution to the optimization problem of hydroelectric operator it q is (see Technical Appendix A1):
Based on (7) and the dynamic equation of stocks given by the expression in (2), the solution to the variation in stock in the hydropower dam in region i is:
and total production of the monopoly is:
Case of abundance of water in region i and shortage in region j
In this case, there is an increase in the average precipitation inflows in region i ( We assume that the gap between the variation of the rate of refilling of dam i and that of dam j is written as:
The total effect of fluctuations in water inflows in the two regions on production by the power plant of region
The operator must therefore perform additional pumping from the dam of the region with abundant water and additional storage in the dam in the region with scarce water. The total impact of fluctuations in water inflows in the two regions i and j on production by the dam of region j is:
Further, variation in total production of the two dams
The variation in total production of the two dams depends on the sign of
expressions (10) and (11), the impact of fluctuations of recharge flows on the amount of water available in the hydropower dam in region j is identical to that observed in region i:
These results show that under its optimal solution, the monopoly have to keep the same change in stock in all dams by increasing its electricity production in the region with abundant water and decreasing production in the region with scarce water.
The variation in stock in the dams depends on the net variation in flows in the two regions. If To analyze the effect of risk aversion on total production, we compare the variation in total production with and without risk aversion. We have: 9 In the case where the average variation in flows of the two dams is not identical, q F    . In this case as well, the operator must satisfy electricity demand through additional pumping from the reservoir in the region with abundant water and reduce its production in the region with scarce water. To smooth the effects of this fluctuation of flows on electricity prices, it must ensure that this additional storage in the region with scarce water equalizes the additional discharge in the region with abundant water:
This result shows that when the operator is risk neutral and the net flow of precipitation is positive (negative), the increase (decrease) in total production of the two regions is greater than when the operator is risk averse.
Case of abundant water in regions i and j
We denote the gap between the variation in the refilling speed of dam j and that of region i by  :
Proposition 1 In the case where the hydropower producer observes an increase in the average flow of precipitation in the two regions i and j (
, he decides to perform: 
The proof of proposition 1 follows from equations (13) and (14).
The additional discharge in the two regions due to abundant water is given as:
Whereas the additional storage of water is evaluated at:
In this case we have:
. In other words, in the case of abundant water in both regions, the additional inter-annual transfer of water from period t to period t+1 is less than its additional use at period t. In this section, we consider an electricity industry with an oligopolistic structure, with n firms that compete a la Cournot. The profit of hydroelectric firm i in period t is written as: 
The solution to the problem of maximization gives us equilibrium production of the dynamic Cournot closed-loop game of firm i (see Technical Appendix A2):
In the case where the hydroelectric dams are independent and are in the same region
. This shows that the increase in storage costs motivates producer i to deviate from its equilibrium strategy by additional pumping of its current stock if and only if the average recharge speed of dam i is markedly higher than the water release rhythm 13 from dam i in period t (case of strong hydraulicity), 0 s  . Conversely, the operator must perform additional storage in the case of low water levels 0 s  11 . Further, from (17):
Any increase in risk level reduces production of firm i in period t when all hydroelectric operators have the same average flow of precipitation. Lastly, all increases in the risk aversion rate of firm i reduce the immediate use of water, that is it favors an inter-temporal transfer of water from t to t+1.
Hydroelectricity producer i's production at period t depends positively on its inflow rates and negatively on the sum its competitor's flow of precipitation. Total equilibrium hydroelectric production at period t is written as:
Case of water abundance in region i and scarcity in region j
In this case, the hydroelectric producer in region i observes an increase in its average flow of precipitation   0 i F  , whereas the hydroelectric producer in region j observes an average 11 We have Proposition 3 specifies the conditions under which, in a structure of imperfect competition, the possibility of storing electricity in the form of water may motivate hydroelectric operators to manage their water resources strategically according to the relative scarcity of water inflows in the dams. Case (i) is that of two dams situated in regions where the average abundance of water resources in the dam of hydroelectricity producer i does not compensate for the average scarcity in the dam of hydroelectricity producer j. In this case, the two hydroelectric operators benefit from deviating from their equilibrium strategy by performing additional pumping in the two regions. Despite the shortage of water in region j, hydroelectricity producer j knows that its competitor does not have sufficient additional water resources to play strategically against it on the electricity market. Hydroelectricity producer j consequently performs strategic pumping in its own dam despite its water shortage.
Condition (ii) is that of a dam of hydroelectricity producer j, which suffers from a shortage whereas the dam of hydroelectricity producer i experiences an increase in average water inflows.
In this case, the abundance of inflows prompts the hydroelectricity producer to play strategically on the electricity market against hydroelectricity producer j, which suffers from a severe water shortage, by doing additional storage of this positive variation of its water inflows: this corresponds to strategic water storage. By additional pumping despite the scarcity of its water resources, producer j exacerbates its situation.
Under condition (iii), the hydroelectric operators increase additional storage in both dams when the gap between the variations in the average water inflows in region i and that in region j is less than the increase in average water inflows in the region with abundant water. In other words, in the case where the two dams are in two regions where the average abundance of water resources in the dam of hydroelectricity producer i can relatively compensate for the average scarcity in the dam of hydroelectricity producer j, the two players deviate from their equilibrium strategy by additionally reducing electricity production in both dams, i.e. the one with scarce water and the one with abundant water. The hydroelectricity producer with a water shortage, namely that in region j, knows that its competitor has not a sufficient increase in water inflows to play strategically against it. Because the water scarcity of hydroelectricity producer j is not severe relative to the water abundance of hydroelectricity producer i, then hydroelectricity producer j can respond to the strategic storage of hydroelectricity producer i by doing its own additional storage.
The solutions of it q  and jt q  (equations (19) and (20)) let us deduce the impact of the variation of precipitation inflows on total production  
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The variation in total production of the two dams depends on the sign of  . If 0
In the case where the increase in average water inflows in region i is less than the average scarcity in dam j, then total equilibrium production decreases. In other words, the relative scarcity of water resources in the whole stock favors additional storage of water. Conversely, relative abundance of water favors additional pumping at all hydropower reservoirs. In both cases, regardless of the hydroelectric operators' strategic behavior, the reservoirs will be operated with respect to merit order principle.
The effect of the risk aversion coefficient on 
Case of abundant water in regions i and j
In this case, the hydroelectric operators in regions i and j observe an increase in the flow of Under condition (i), hydropower operator i has a larger increase in average water inflows than that of hydroelectricity producer j. Because hydroelectricity producer i knows that the average increase in its water inflows can compensate for the gap in the variation of inflows in the two regions, he decides to do additional pumping on its dam. Consequently, hydroelectricity producer j can respond only by additional storage. In case (ii), hydropower operator i experiences an increase in its average water inflows that is slightly greater than that which occurs at the dam of hydroelectricity producer j. In this case, both hydroelectric operators do additional pumping. In case (iii), hydroelectricity producer j has a larger increase in its average inflows than that of hydroelectricity producer i. The relative abundance of water resources in the dam of hydroelectricity producer j compared with that of hydroelectricity producer i prompts operator i to increase its production, whereas hydroelectricity producer i will store its additional inflows.
Dam management under a duopolistic structure with asymmetric attitude toward risk
In this section, we assume that the hydroelectricity producers do not have the same attitude toward risk ( i j AA  ). Equilibrium electricity production under the Cournot Nash closedloop strategy is (see Technical Appendix A3):
The equilibrium strategy of hydroelectricity producer i at period t depends on several parameters including the risk aversion rates , ij AA and uncertainty of electricity demand 2  . The sensitivity of a firm's hydroelectric production relative to its competitor's risk aversion coefficient is:
We have 0
represents the threshold at which the variation of the risk aversion coefficient of firm j has no effect on the water pumping strategy of hydroelectricity producer i at period t.
In the case where the average inflows of the competing firm is below the threshold
increases in the risk aversion coefficient of operator j leads producer i to deviate from its equilibrium strategy by performing additional storage of its current stock. However, this condition is possible only if the average inflow of dam j is slightly lower than that of dam i. If the relative weakness of the average water inflows in dam j is associated with an increase in the risk aversion coefficient of hydroelectricity producer j, hydroelectricity producer i will compete strategically by performing additional storage of its potential energy. The increase in j A triggers raises the variability of the profit of producer j, which it must minimize through additional 20 decreases in equilibrium water pumping at dam j. Therefore, the additional gain from minimization of the variance of the profit of operator j does not offset the additional loss in that operator's expected profit, and is compounded by its lower average water inflows. Consequently, operator j decides to store additional water. This additional storage increases the average electricity price and consequently augments the marginal gain on immediate use of a unit of water in the dam of competitor i, which has more abundant average inflow. To further increase its current gain, operator i decides to play strategically against its competitor by further lowering its production because it knows that hydroelectricity producer j cannot compete strategically against it on electricity wholesale market. In the opposite case, hydroelectricity producer i does additional strategic pumping of potential energy.
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The sensitivity study of a firm's production relative to the variation of its own risk aversion coefficient is: 
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In other words, when the increase in the risk aversion coefficient of hydroelectricity producer i coincides with a relative weakness in average water inflow in its competitor's dam j, this favors additional storage by firm i. If hydroelectricity producer i is more risk averse, then additional reduction in water pumping from its dam at period t lets it minimize the variance of its profit. It can thus raise the expected utility of its profit following an increase in the average price of electricity at the current period. However, the marginal gain from the rise in price does not compensate for the marginal loss due to the increase in its risk aversion coefficient.
Consequently, according to the first first-order condition (see the Technical appendix A3), the marginal gain from pumping an additional unit from the dam of hydroelectricity producer i at period t always remains below the marginal value of the same unit of water in stock; this favors additional storage in dam i. In the case where the increase in risk aversion coefficient of producer i coincides with abundance in average water inflows in the dam of competitor j relative to dam i ( 
An increase in the variance of electricity demand at a given period will not affect the expected instantaneous profit of hydroelectricity producer i. It has a positive effect uniquely on the variance of producer i's profit and consequently favors a drop in expected utility of the total 22 profit of i. Given that hydroelectricity producer i must minimize the variance of its instantaneous profit, its only option is to reduce current water pumping. This additional storage of water, with all things being equal, lowers the average electricity price. However, the marginal gain from the drop in variance in instantaneous profit does not offset the marginal loss from the decline in expected profit. According to the condition of optimality, this creates a negative gap between the marginal income from immediate pumping of a unit of water from dam i and its in situ price, which justifies additional storage of water for future use.
Conclusion
In 2012, hydroelectricity supplied 16.3% of world electricity and in several countries, hydropower is the main source of electricity (e.g. Brazil, Norway, province of Quebec in Canada, New Zealand). And, because of its contribution to climate change mitigation, the share of hydroelectricity in total world electricity is expected to grow in the future decades (IPCC, 2014).
Nonetheless, the economic literature has mainly analyzed the strategic behavior of electricity operators in purely thermal systems or mixed hydrothermal systems. Purely hydroelectric industries with large water storage capacities have attracted sparsely attention. In addition, little works have integrated risk dimension, which is quite salient for suppliers of hydropower. Water reserves are renewed randomly by precipitation and given the climate change phenomenon and the associated series of extreme events (IPCC, 2014) , the challenge of optimal management of this resource over several periods of time has become more pressing. On the demand side, operators of hydroelectric plants are also facing several sources of uncertainty closely linked to different categories of electricity demands (residential, commercial and industrial) .
In this paper, we analyzed the problem of water resource management under two industrial structures, monopolistic and oligopolistic, when hydroelectricity producers are risk averse and face uncertainty on demands. Analytic resolution of the problem of dynamic stochastic optimization show how a monopoly can manage its hydropower reservoirs through additional pumping or storage depending on the relative abundance of water between regions to smooth the effect of uncertainty on electricity prices. In addition, risk aversion reduces the variation of water pumping when the net flow of precipitation is positive or negative.
